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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

## INFORMATION REPORT

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discussion of recent developments in the Soviet bloc.

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12 December 1956

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1. USSR

a. (1) Soviet policy must still remain on the defensive in the Satellite countries and has to follow the self-inflicted process of loosening policies which slipped from its control. This particularly applies to Hungary where Army and Security Service, the actual props of the Soviet power, were most exposed. All other attempts having failed, extreme terrorism, carefully covered up by a complete information black-out, is now being employed to obtain that measure of still refused popular collaboration without which no political and economic administration is possible. The compromise concluded with Gomulka in Poland also still has a very weak basis and the future attitude of the population is a matter of great concern to both Gomulka and the Soviets. Since the situation in the Satellite countries is still unclear and Moscow failed to come out with definite and basic decisions, the Soviets are now trying to catch up with the presently uncontrolled development by flexibly making concessions wherever an opportunity offered as for example in Poland, but do not refrain from employing even compromising methods, if this is in the interest of their empire and if the development became intolerable as, for example, in Hungary.

(2) Highlighting Moscow's present Satellite policies are two supplementary reports on Shepilov's visit to East Berlin on 30 November which indicated that Shepilov reprimanded Puzhkin because of his attitude during the critical days of the Polish-Hungarian crisis and recommended that he assume more conciliatory tactics toward all East Bloc ambassadors. He also suggested that Ulbricht improve the relations with Poland and urged that Tito be kept in the camp of Socialism. He termed the situation in the Eastern Bloc extremely grave and said that all possible efforts had to be made to strengthen the Socialist camp. He added that the Soviet Union was determined to give all necessary economic aid even if economic aid to the countries in Asia and the Arab World would have to be suspended temporarily. At a conference which was held at Shepilov's initiative on 1 December, Puzhkin followed this line before diplomatic representatives of the East Bloc countries in East Berlin, stating that the Soviet Union was not resentful, wanted to have the unpleasant chapter of the past closed as soon as possible and was prepared to do everything in its power to tide the Socialist countries over the economic difficulties.

b. With the development in the critical area of the Soviet cordon of Satellites still being fluid and no lasting solutions shaping up, the Soviets have to resort to political improvisations and are not at present in a position to reformulate their basic political line as became necessary after the events of the recent period and was repeatedly announced in a number of reports.

the general line of the XX Party Congress was no longer considered intangible but would only be discussed after a further clarification of the situation and in this conjunction also mentioned that the expanded plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which had been planned for December would be postponed indefinitely. Such postponement is scarcely to be expected for the planned session of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid, since time is of importance in that field and the solution of

25X1

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25X1

- 2 -

merely factual problems is on the agenda. [redacted] the Soviet collective leadership was divided over what policies of the XX Party congress had to be revised. The Soviets are worried not only by the progressing emancipation and loosening tendencies in the Satellite countries but also by certain symptoms in the Soviet Union such as the state of ferment of the youth, the aloofness of the intelligentsia and a sensible dissatisfaction among workers.

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- c. The problem of a reformulation of the basic political line is closely connected with the still unclear situation in the collective leadership. Most of the reports indicate a closer getting together of the various exponents and a temporary suspension of their differences and personal rivalries in the face of the crisis and the dangers with which the Soviet orbit is confronted. [redacted]

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[redacted] an equilibrium prevailed between the various forces and tendencies in the Soviet collective leadership [redacted] the scales could gradually tip toward a majority of the Molotov group. This fact of the still unsettled situation of the top-level Soviet leadership also is a determining factor for the procrastination of basic political decisions and their official announcement.

- d. [redacted] in view of the critical situation the Soviet leadership became aware that a new foreign-policy diversion offensive is imperative. One of the first steps in that direction is the disarmament overture which [redacted]

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[redacted] aims to barter a weakening of Western Europe for the weakening of Moscow in the Satellite area. [redacted] the collective leadership had not yet made up its mind on the direction and extent of this diversion action. Any offensive military intentions in Europe as a sort of a "forward escape" cannot, however, at present be seen in the military picture of the situation or be gathered from political reports. The massive accusations against the West which Moscow voiced in conjunction with Hungary primarily served internal Soviet consumption and are designed to justify the Soviet attitude and methods in Hungary before the Soviet population and the population of the Satellite countries.

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## 2. Satellites and Yugoslavia

- a. (1) [redacted] the loosening of the iron clamp with which the Polish economy had so far been clamped together by the Stalinist bureaucracy partially regulated in chaotic conditions in industry and agriculture. On 30 November,

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SECRET  
NOFORN

- 3 -

for example, miners in Kattovics stormed the district administration building, manhandled managing directors and pillaged state shops without the police taking action. Many collective farms in the country are going to be dissolved.

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the situation was even more serious. workers had been forced to work overtime and, in many instances, lived in abject misery.

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- (2) on the basis of a mutual agreement, Tito's visit to Warsaw was postponed to the spring of 1957 in order not to embarrass the Soviets. A Yugoslav delegation headed by Kardelj is now scheduled to visit Warsaw in an effort to bolster the position of Gomulka who is in high esteem in Belgrade.

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Gomulka wanted to exploit mounting Western sympathy toward his regime to obtain Western recognition of the Oder-Neisse border. He reasoned that he could then effect the withdrawal of the Soviet troops and reunification of Germany. A propaganda offensive toward the West will probably be conducted to that effect. The agreement which the Polish Government concluded with the Catholic Church and in which the Polish Government was prepared to remove all major obstacles to freedom of religion also tried to reinforce Western sympathies for the new regime in Poland.

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Gomulka is more closely connected with Moscow than is usually assumed even in Poland.

- b. The Hungarian people, left without any outside help, puts up a persistent and heroic resistance fight which completely discredits Moscow's thesis that the rebellion was unleashed by fascist counter-revolutionaries. General strike employed by unified workers threatening for freedom proved to be an instrument which Soviet imperialism must expect to be used also by other oppressed nations. The Hungarian workers and farmers have the merit of having shown this fact to both their fellow-sufferers in the Satellite countries and the world. Their example strengthened the national Communist and anti-Soviet tendencies in the other Satellite countries and thus will contribute to urging on the development which followed the announcement of the doctrines of the XX Party Day, a fact, which will exert Moscow's strategic capacities. Indications for the continuation of this development became apparent in Poland and Bulgaria. the resistance will probably subside because of exhaustion and starvation and arrests of strike leaders.

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only a fraction of the members of the former Communist Party of Hungary was willing to join the "Socialist Workers Party" set up by the present Communist rulers. Soviet military authorities prevented local elections for district and county councils, thus showing both the extent of Soviet interference with internal affairs in Hungary and the impotence of the Kadar Government.

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SECRET  
NOFORN

- 4 -

c. The agreement which Rumania concluded with the Soviet Union is less favorable than the agreement which the Poles concluded with the Soviets, since the volume of credits for goods is smaller and the deadline for debts which had to be refunded during the period from 1955 to 1959 was only postponed. While Poland was promised a bilateral agreement on the presence of Soviet troops, Bucharest was only promised non-committal consultative contacts. In contrast to the Polish Government, the Rumanian Government also completely endorsed the ouelling of the Hungarian rebellion by Soviet troops. The establishment of the direction committee for an "electorate bloc for all democratic and patriotic forces" under the chairmanship of Gheorghiu-Dej, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Rumania, shows that the Communist-controlled unity list will also be used in the forthcoming elections.

d. The tensions in Bulgaria [redacted] were again confirmed by more recent reports which stated that the mass arrests also involved persons who had only recently been freed by the Kostoff amnesty. The growing economic difficulties showed that the second Five Year Plan could not be executed, and the Soviets had to invest large sums in Bulgaria to prevent a catastrophic development which may result in disturbances. Bulgaria which never had to import wheat now had to apply for a wheat loan in the Soviet Union.

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e. [redacted] the Soviet Embassy in Belgrade in response to a question by Tito for the reason behind the Soviet troop concentrations along the Yugoslav border stated that the Soviet forces in Hungary had invaded the country only in connection with the events in that country and in Rumania to prevent disturbances and were not directed against Yugoslavia. It had already been stated [redacted] that Belgrade did apparently not at the present moment fear a Soviet military intervention. [redacted] the Yugoslav Government sent a note of protest to the Kadar Government because of the kidnapping of Imre Nagy but at the same time continuously negotiated the repatriation of Hungarian refugees with the Hungarian Embassy in Belgrade. [redacted] the Hungarian Government was given the possibility of visiting refugee camps and influencing refugees. Although Yugoslavia did not violate the right of asylum, the Yugoslaves interpreted this right in favor of Kadar in order not to deteriorate their relations with the Eastern Bloc. The Yugoslav Government turned down, however, the Soviet-spread and Satellite-supported thesis of a Fascist-instigated and reactionary revolution in Hungary (which of all satellites only Poland did not accept) and also continued its press campaign concerning the responsibility for the events there. The Yugoslav Government also withdrew its initial support to the Kadar Government because of the unfaithfulness in the case of Imre Nagy and on the ground that the Kadar Government had proved a mere Soviet puppet.

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### 3. Soviet Zone of Germany

a. Axen's reply to Edda Werfel's article contributed to intensify Poland's negative attitude toward the SPD. The SPD newspapers now follow Shchilov's and Puschkin's orders (see paragraph 1 a) and employ more conciliatory tones with constant reference to the danger of a "West German revisionism."

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NOFORN

- 5 -

- b. [redacted] the opposition in the SED leadership against Ulbricht initiated activities which aim to bring about the resignation of Ulbricht, Schirdewan and Matern. This opposition includes Rau, Seibmann, Oelssner and, since recently, Tornke and has Dahlen for its spiritual leader. January 1957 was mentioned as a possible date for Ulbricht's resignation. A change of such political magnitude would of course require the consent of the Soviet Government. It is unlikely, however, that Moscow should consider a change of course and a top-level reshuffle of fortune at the present moment. Ulbricht's position must not at present be considered weakened and the present hard course had even sharpened by the last arrests of intellectuals and economic functionaries. A speech which Dahlen made before students of a Party indoctrination course seemed to indicate that he is propagating certain nationalist tendencies. There is little likelihood, however, that a national Communist regime, even if Moscow consented, could be established in the Soviet zone of Germany in view of the complete lack of support by the masses.
- c. The decreasing deliveries of hard coal and ore from Poland make the fulfillment of the current economic plans doubtful. Only 50 percent of the deficit can be made up by deliveries from the USSR. Production stoppages already resulted in reduced working hours, shifting of working times to night shifts in light industries and eventually in unemployment and thus increase the dissatisfaction of the workers.
- d. It was again stated that a conference of the "Council for Mutual Economic Aid" will soon take place either in Moscow, East Berlin or Prague. The necessity of such a conference is apparent. The GDR fears that far-reaching aid measures will have to be taken by the GDR in favor of the other Eastern Bloc countries.
- e. The workers conference which convened in East Berlin on 7 and 8 December again urged for establishment of workers committees which were interpreted along the lines of the regime. The SED is well aware of the risks involved in the setting-up of any kind of workers councils and is thus trying to delegate only reliable workers to these committees. In the event of primaries, there will, however, probably be sharp conflicts between the Party and Labor Union functionaries and the workers. Non-partisan members were also elected to the enterprise Labor Union headquarters in the FDGB elections despite quite different directives. Workers are also increasingly demanding higher wages. Since only an insufficient volume of goods is available for increased buying power, the Party leadership sharply rejects any such demands which are branded as "hostile concepts". The workers became aware of the strength of passive resistance because of the example of Hungary.
- f. Local elections [redacted] will take place in February or March 1957. They had repeatedly been postponed. Only a unity list of the National Front will be admitted in these elections. Elections for the SED Party headquarters are scheduled to take place in January and February 1957.

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19 December 1956

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I. Political1. USSR

- a. (1) The expected plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is now close at hand. An insignificant delay evidently resulted from the fact that Shepilov and Zubev were away from Moscow for a short time. Their visit to Warsaw and the speedy completion of the agreement on the presence of Soviet troops in Poland had become necessary because of Gomulka who urgently needed aid in his struggle for popular support in Poland. The fact that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is convening still this month shows that the Soviets are pressed for time and that the Presidium of the Central Committee reached a certain measure of agreement on the measures to be taken in the near future which are deemed necessary for the overcoming of the present crisis. The impending conferences within the framework of the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Aid call for important decisions which must be discussed before the plenary session of the Central Committee.

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[redacted] a comprehensive agenda for this plenary session and [redacted] Malenkov, Suslov and Minister of Finance Sverev would also make speeches in addition to a large number of others. [redacted] Malenkov and his tendencies had received new impetus from the recent development and [redacted] the Soviets were aware that raising the living standards was of primary importance in the fight of the world systems. [redacted] economic problems figured prominently among the subjects to be discussed by the plenary session and [redacted] Sverev would discuss the 1957 budget which would drop all pushed investment policies. Another supplementary information indicated that the Soviets want to procure consumer goods in the world market with the help of their gold reserves.

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- (2) [redacted] the Central Committee would try to substantiate the pronouncement dated 30 October 1956 on the rearrangement of relations in the Socialist camp. [redacted] the Warsaw Pact which in the past had served as a useful instrument of foreign-policy but had proved unsatisfactory in military respects would have to be revised. Moscow now argued that Communist Internationalism would in the future be marked by its "diversity" and would be transformed, as it were, into a "competition of ideas". There would be no open outbreak of the latent conflict in the collective leadership and no sensational top-level reshuffles of personnel, since the Soviet leaders decided to make common efforts to overcome the crisis.

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- b. As had already been reported, the Soviet leadership, fully aware of the crisis which resulted from their Satellite policies and which, according to recent information on unrest in the Baltic republics and particularly in Lithuania, even split over into the interior of the Soviet Union, and particularly involved the youth, is dominated by a strong desire for a foreign-policy diversion offensive. The possibilities for such offensive are, however, extremely limited because of the event which has its repercussions on the policy of coexistence.

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- 2 -

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## 2. Satellites and Yugoslavia

- a. The brutal Soviet military intervention in Hungary strengthened anti-Soviet feelings in the Polish population which is pro-Hungarian by tradition. The Polish regime is consequently making every effort to prevent anti-Soviet demonstrations such as those in Stettin, stating that it was necessary to spare the Polish Nation the fate of Hungary.

[redacted] Gembika and Cyrankiewicz voiced pessimism regarding such efforts at a secret session of the Polish Communist Party. They are aware that because it will not be possible to overcome quickly the economic difficulties and raise soon the living standards of the population, they will not escape a new serious crisis which both the Stalinists and anti-Soviet groups will exploit for attack against the present regime. The speedy conclusion of the Soviet-Polish agreement on the presence of Soviet troops in Poland evidently tends to calm down anti-Soviet feelings. The near future will show to what extent this measure was a success.

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- b. [redacted] the Hungarian government is planning to prepare a program attractive enough to bring round the majority of the workers and the intelligentsia to make peace with the regime.

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[redacted] non-partisan specialists would be employed and farmers who during recent weeks had left the collective farms would not be forced to join them again and also indicated that Kadar hoped to get support for the rehabilitation of Hungary not only from the Eastern Bloc but also from capitalist countries in the form of long-term credits. Whether or not it will be possible to fulfill these optimistic expectations of the regime in view of the negative attitude of large numbers of the population remains to be seen. Although the Soviets and Kadar may score a subsiding of resistance as a success of their terrorism, they will scarcely be able to gain a basis of trust from a large number of the population in spite of the small concessions they already granted or announced.

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- c. No major disturbances are to be expected in Czechoslovakia because of the favorable working and living conditions prevailing there. The Czech rulers continue their Stalinist course tempered only by small-scale concessions. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia significantly cold-shouldered the Yugoslav regime. [redacted] the tensions in Bulgaria [redacted] continue.

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SECRET  
- 3 - NOFORN

- d. In an effort not to aggravate differences with the Soviet Union and part of its Satellites, Tito, [redacted] suggested that a Soviet-Yugoslav committee be set up to check on all ideological differences. The Yugoslav delegation [redacted] were strongly impressed by the negative attitude which the pro-Moscow Communist Parties assumed toward Titoism. Another report indicated that Belgrade is concerned about the political development because the Yugoslav workers are dissatisfied with their wages and living conditions.

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### 3. Soviet Zone of Germany

- a. [redacted] the visits Soviet-zone delegations paid in Warsaw and Prague were initiated by Moscow which tried at least outwardly to consolidate the relations of the various Warsaw-Pact countries. Moscow had wished that Matern and Rau rather than Ulbricht be sent to Warsaw since they were better suited to settle the differences between the SED and the Polish Communist Party. Their delegation prepared the now current economic talks on the exchange of goods in 1957 and probably also reached an agreement that party-political conflicts be not discussed in public. Ulbricht's task in Prague was less complicated. The economic talks went smoothly and the partners viewed the events in the Satellite countries eye to eye. Pankov as well as Prague assumed a negative attitude toward Tito and [redacted] considered a possible procrastination of the execution of the aid measures which the Yugoslaves had been promised in the summer of 1956. In regard to the Polish situation they felt that it would be undesirable further to affront Poland, particularly since Gomulka's position was less stable than had been assumed. The fact that a Soviet zone delegation was sent to Moscow is due to fears by Pankov that during forthcoming talks on necessary changes of the universal eastern Five-Year Plan changes may be made in favor of Poland and Hungary. The delegation conceivably is to try to save and have again confirmed the Soviet promise of July 1956 that the Soviet zone of Germany would be made the show-window of Socialism.
- b. By promptly executing Soviet directives concerning his policies toward Poland and Yugoslavia, Ulbricht again proved a completely reliable and subservient henchman of Moscow, particularly since a cold war against Poland would much more be in keeping with his desire for a clear separation of views. Regarding Yugoslavia he was given free hand within certain limits by Shepilov. On 13 December 1956, the "Neues Deutschland" newspaper again sharply attacked certain policy formulations which Tito had made in his Tola speech.
- c. At the 43rd session of the NPD Main Committee which was held in Cottbus on 26 and 27 November 1956, Bolz clearly outlined the situation with which the Soviet-zone rulers are confronted. In view of the attempts by the Party headquarters completely to disregard the recent revolutionary events and their effects on Party activities and in view of an almost rebellious attitude of those who were present at the session, he frankly stated that all other problems were of secondary importance when compared with the necessity of staying in power. He said that only the alternative of either strengthening the position of power or falling down was left and stated that concessions or yielding could save nothing and would only encourage the opponents. Using Ulbricht's formulations on reunification he said that the GDR was not an example but a model for a reunified Germany and that saving peace rather than reunifying Germany was the question at present.

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- 4 -

- d. It is significant that by using these formulations, Bolz clearly sided with Ulbricht and evidently believed that the activities of Ulbricht's opponents had no chances of success. All individual measures taken in the zone also indicate that Ulbricht's fist is still strong, with students being removed from universities, and numerous arrests being made and the Protestant bishops receiving no concessions on the church question. The speech which Ulbricht made on the question of the workers committees also showed that he was not willing to give these committees real influence. The Kremlin evidently also did not yet decide to change the course in the Soviet zone of Germany where things continue to ferment. This became apparent in articles of the "Neues Deutschland" newspaper which called on the students or, written by Brede, tried to enlist the support of the intelligentsia or, written by Narke, addressed the workers. Narke's attitude toward Ulbricht remains problematical, however.

## II. Economic

### 1. Economic measures in the Soviet Bloc

The fact that the economic capacities of most of the European Satellite countries and particularly those of Poland and Hungary were overcharged, will make it necessary for the Soviet Bloc to revise its plans. The production in Poland slowed down and no industrial production will probably be forthcoming in Hungary during a period of at least several months. It will probably not be possible to satisfy even the most urgent demands in and outside these countries. Since raising the living standards was one of the revolutionary demands which the Soviet Union had to satisfy to a certain degree, the Soviet Union as well as the individual European Satellites are presently in a precarious situation which will probably even become worse. These economic difficulties also threaten to impair the political stability of the European Satellites. Increased Soviet delivery must and can make up for the deficit of the bad crops while the most urgent demands of high quality food stuff and industrial consumer goods can on short notice only be made available by Western imports. As a result of this situation it is rather definitely to be believed that revision measures similar to those of the new course in 1953 are to be expected. They will probably include the following short-term and long-term plan corrections:

- a. The Soviet Union will make available to the Satellite countries both gold and hard currency credits for the purpose of high-quality food-stuff and industrial consumer goods. The first of Soviet sales of gold for the procurement of currency had already been noticed.
- b. The Satellite countries will immediately stop all socialization measures and partially even denationalize trade and commerce and thus try to activate handicraft production reserves to overcome the shortage of consumer goods produced by trades.
- c. The Five-Year Plan of most of the European Satellites will be revised and will be coordinated along the lines of a new course without, however, probably affecting the production plans of basic industry and power generation. Those plan revisions will probably be marked by a slight reduction of the production of heavy and armament industry, a slight increase of the production of industrial consumer goods and a stronger pushing of agriculture. The preparation of this "New Plan" will take a period of between 6 and 9 months.

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- 5 -

The increase in the production of the consumer goods industry can, however, scarcely take effect before a period of two years because of the difficulties resulting from the switching of labor and means of production from other industries to consumer goods industry. Temporary unemployment may also result.

- d. The Soviet Union, by making phased concessions, will try to obviate certain demands for plan revisions which are to be expected in those European Satellite countries not yet involved in the present difficulties.
  - e. Although no indications of a "new course" have so far become apparent in the Soviet Union, one report already indicated the possibility that similar corrections as those indicated in paragraph II, 1, c above regarding the Satellite countries will possibly also be executed there. The Soviets have so far tried to silence undoubtedly existing protests against the low living standards by initiating financial measures such as increased wages and social welfare and price cuts and by executing cut-downs on working hours.
2. The presently exceedingly good armament situation of the Soviet Union and the fact that the Soviet Army, Navy and Air Force were largely reequipped with modern weapons makes possible a breathing space in the sense of a new course.

### III. Military

#### 1. The Soviet Military Situation in the Satellite Area

- a. The Warsaw Pact which had been a primarily political construction for the outmaneuvering of the West-European Union (WEU) and NATO and which had been announced and propagandized as a defense instrument against alleged Western aggression did not change the military structure in the Eastern Bloc. The establishment of a joint high command for the armed forces of the pact countries only underscored the existence of an unrestricted Soviet high command. The disturbances in Poland and Hungary as well as the remembrance of the June 1955 rebellion in the Soviet Zone of Germany during which 19 of the 22 Soviet divisions stationed in the zone had been employed for the quelling of the uprising must have made it an ever imperative for the Soviets to strengthen their troops in the Satellite countries. The Soviet forces (2 divisions) presently stationed in Poland, for example, will not be able to secure communication lines between the Soviet Union and the Soviet Zone of Germany in the event of major disturbances or to quell an uprising in Poland. (Compare the preparations which the Soviets made during the crisis in Poland). Agreements which Moscow concluded with individual Satellites as a result of the recent events (compare the new Soviet-Polish agreement on the presence of Soviet forces in Poland) in addition to the Warsaw Pact will now make it possible for the Soviets to strengthen their position in the Satellite area and to provide sufficient military safeguards.
- b. Hints that the Soviets may withdraw their troops from the Satellite countries (excepting   Poland and the Soviet Zone of Germany) belong to Soviet disarmament tactics and must be rated accordingly. These tactics strive to weaken the Western defense system by offering an alleged weakening in the Soviet area. If the Soviet forces were actually withdrawn from the Satellite area and even only from part of that area, the military position of the SU would considerably be weakened particularly with

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regard to installations of air defense. The Soviets continue to improve their military installations and particularly their air bases as they had done for years. These comprehensive military investments show that for a long time to come Moscow is determined to keep the positions which it gained in and after the second World War.

c. Soviet Fleet Demonstrations in Connection with the Political Disturbances in Poland.

Soviet Navy movements observed during the October tensions in Poland revealed the following: in mid-October 1956, a considerable number of Soviet naval vessels, that is a total of 19 vessels including the three SVERDLOV cruisers stationed in the Baltic were assembled in the area west of the Bay of Danzig and kept on alert. On 19 October, the day the riots broke out, a Soviet fleet demonstration in the area of Hel and the Polish coast involved three SVERDLOV cruisers, approximately 10 destroyers and 20 speed boats. A second unit consisting of 1 cruiser and 2 destroyers ran along the Polish coast toward west during the night of 19 October and put to Swinemunde during the morning of 19 October. At about noon that day another destroyer of type KOTLIN joined the unit, while a RIGA escort destroyer which had been stationed in Swinemunde was detached to Stettin. The three cruisers of the firstmentioned unit remained on the roads of Gdengen until 23 October, and part of the other vessels stayed in Gdengen. In the evening of 23 October, all ships left this area. The Swinemunde group of vessels was on alert until 23 October, the day on which three destroyers were still based in the harbor. It could not definitely be determined whether or not the cruiser and another destroyer had already put to sea at that time. All this goes to show that already prior to the outbreak of disturbances the Soviet Baltic Fleet had assembled and effectively displayed for demonstration its "operation" units at important points along the Polish coast. The importance of Swinemunde as advance base was particularly apparent.

d. Soviet Escort Destroyers Turned Over to Soviet Zone NVA Seestreitkräfte.

On 7 December 1956, two Soviet escort destroyers of the modern RIGA Class seen with black-red-golden flag in Swinemunde indicated that Soviet naval vessels were turned over to the Soviet Zone Navy, as had been announced some time ago.

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